Pearl Harbor vs.
9/11
When asked the question, “What impresses
you more about George W. Bush and Barack Obama, their absence of intelligence
or their absence of integrity,” a ready answer comes to mind, and it is clearly
not the same for each. But in the case
of Bush’s first Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, I think you will have to
agree that it’s a tough call.
That was the first thing that came to my
mind when I saw in the pages of The New York Times that Rumsfeld had
essayed a comparison between the momentous events in Hawaii on December 7,
1941, and in New York City, Arlington, VA, and Shanksville, PA, on September
11, 2001. The one big similarity that he
was able to note was that—as the official script reads—we were caught
completely by surprise in each case.
In turn, that got me to thinking along the
lines that I lay out in the opening paragraphs of my article, “America’s Dreyfus Affair, the Case of the
Death of Vincent Foster.” Suppose you
were a professor of United States history and had the opportunity to give the
following assignment to your students in an exam: “Compare and contrast Pearl Harbor and 9/11.”
What are the answers that you would be looking for from your best students?
Surely they would have to say that each of the events resulted in our going to
war. That’s where the comparison
almost has to begin. But no sooner have
we written it than a contrast arises.
When Japan attacked us, we were, by definition, already at war. Disregarding, for the moment, what might have
led up to the attack, one could hardly say about our war with Japan, as with
our subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, that it was a “war of
choice.” One might argue, however, that
the war with Germany was a war of
choice, even though Hitler declared war on the United States four days later on December 11. His rationale was not, as is commonly
believed, that they were obligated by treaty to do so, but that the United
States had every intention of going to war with Germany after the attack and he
might as well beat us to the punch. One
can’t read FDR’s speech of December 9,
1941, and come to any other conclusion than that Hitler was correct in his
assessment, whether or not the “beating to the punch” move was wise from a
propaganda perspective. That FDR speech
laid the blame for the Pearl Harbor attack as much on Germany as on Japan and
was clearly intended to prepare the country for war with all three Axis powers,
Germany, Italy, and Japan.
The
next strong comparison that can be made is that the wars that resulted were wars that powerful people within the United
States government wanted to happen. For
months Roosevelt had been doing almost everything he could to provoke Hitler
into attacking us, but Hitler would not go for the bait. Even Roosevelt’s greatest defenders will
admit that this was true. They argue
that it was simply the right thing to do to ally ourselves with Britain (and
the Soviet Union) against “Nazi aggression.” The big problem, from that
perspective, is that the mood of the country was still strongly against our
involvement in “foreign wars,” based upon our bitter World War I
experience. In a campaign speech on October 30,
1940, as the European war raged, Roosevelt had catered to the national mood
with these words, “And while I am talking to you mothers and fathers, I give
you one more assurance. I have said this
before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going
to be sent into any foreign wars.”
Pearl
Harbor got him off the hook that he had created for himself with that
promise. It wasn’t a “foreign war”
anymore because we had been attacked.
Similarly,
the key people in the George W. Bush administration, including Rumsfeld, but
also his top assistant Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney, as
members of The Project for the New American Century (PNAC) in 2000 had called
for precisely the sort of aggressive military policy that followed 9/11, but
acknowledged that it would not happen very quickly “absent a catastrophic and
catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor.”
Two
events brought PNAC into the mainstream of American government: the disputed
election of George W. Bush, and the attacks of September 11th. When Bush
assumed the Presidency, the men who created and nurtured the imperial dreams of
PNAC became the men who run the Pentagon, the Defense Department and the White
House. When the Towers came down, these men saw, at long last, their chance to
turn their White Papers into substantive policy.
Vice President Dick Cheney
is a founding member of PNAC, along with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and
Defense Policy Board chairman Richard Perle. Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is the ideological father of the group. Bruce
Jackson, a PNAC director, served as a Pentagon official for Ronald Reagan
before leaving government service to take a leading position with the weapons
manufacturer Lockheed Martin.
-- “The Project for
the New American Century,” by William Rivers Pitt
This
“new Pearl Harbor” was something of a godsend to the men whose portraits we see in this
video
like the original one was to FDR and to the people behind him.
Maybe
the most important contrast between the two events, again, using only the
official narrative, is that the Japanese
attack plan was, at least tactically, thoroughly rational and depended for its
success upon predictable behavior by the U.S. adversary. By contrast, the 9/11 attacks were tactically
irrational and, on paper, well nigh hopeless, depending as they did upon
unprecedented incompetence on the part the North American Air Defense Command
and amazing docility by airline passengers and crew and no less amazing
competence by novice pilots of airliners.
The Japanese, as we knew, were well served by their espionage agents in
Hawaii and they knew that General Walter Short had not been supplied with an
adequate number of patrol planes to provide sufficient warning by the air
attack from carriers that they planned. *
They also knew from observation that security tended to be somewhat more
relaxed on a Sunday than on any other day.
The Japanese attackers were professionals doing something very similar
to what they must have done many times before in their training.
How
could the supposed 9/11 hijackers have known that the North American Air
Defense Command (NORAD) would not follow its usual protocol and simply intercept the
airplanes
very shortly after they had departed from their normal flight paths? The question holds true in particular for the
attack upon the Pentagon, which occurred a full 51 minutes after the first
plane crashed into the World Trade Center.
Through what extraordinary espionage could the attackers have known in
advance that the U.S. Air Force would send up interceptor jets from Langley Air
Force Base in distant Hampton, Virginia, that would arrive too late, instead of
from nearby Andrews Air Force Base just a few miles away in Maryland or even
Bolling Air Force Base across the river in Washington, DC? See my satire, “Bin Laden’s Home Video: The Missing
Portion,”
for more on this whole question.
The
supposed Al Qaeda plan, as it has been told to us, violated radically the U. S.
military’s KISS (keep it simple, stupid) doctrine and Sun Tzu’s dictum, “Never
underestimate your opponent,” in The Art of War. The Japanese attack plan, by contrast, was
simple and took due regard of our expected defense.
After Pearl Harbor, scapegoats were blamed
and punished. No one has been punished
for allowing 9/11 to happen. Admiral
Husband Kimmel, in charge of the Pacific Fleet—based at Pearl Harbor instead of
San Diego over the vigorous protests of his predecessor—who had been relieved
of his duty over the issue—and General Short were promptly relieved of their
commands and were later blamed by the Roberts Commission for “errors of judgment and dereliction
of duty.”
The
report of the Roberts Commission had its counterpart in the 9/11 Commission
Report. There are no counterparts to Admiral Kimmel
and General Short in that report, however.
To this writer’s knowledge, no individual has ever been singled out for
punishment for what happened. We have
previously summed up the situation with the following poem:
That Government of the People…
The
feds left us unprotected
On that fateful September day.
If we were a truly free
And democratic nation
Somebody up high would pay,
And, to be sure, there would be
A proper investigation,
But wouldn’t you know, it is we
Who get detained and inspected.
At Pearl Harbor,
from the very first moment it was obvious that we were being attacked by the
formidable military of a relatively large country population-wise in
Japan. On 9/11, it was not at all
obvious who was attacking us and it is still not to this day. The authorities and the news media were
suspiciously quick to solve the crime and lay the blame on Osama Bin Laden when
they had been suspiciously incompetent in preventing it. In this aspect of the case, 9/11 resembles
the Oklahoma City bombing and the two Kennedy assassinations and the Martin Luther
King, Jr., assassination more than it resembles the Pearl Harbor attack. Moreover, in terms of the real threat that it
represents to the nation, there is a huge difference between being attacked by
a heavily armed country and being attacked by a ragtag, stateless organization
or group of individuals whose armaments amount to almost nothing.
The strategic objective
of the Japanese was obvious, to gain a large advantage in the shooting-war
phase of its war with the United States.
The 9/11 attacks had no clear objective.
Having
been given an ultimatum by the
United States
that no Japanese government could have accepted, the Japanese leaders initiated
war in precisely the way in which they had been successful in the past. It was either that or be choked and starved
by the U.S. embargo. They were fully
aware that it would bring down the full might of the United States in
retaliation, but they felt they had no choice in the matter. No such rationale existed for Osama Bin Laden
to invite U.S. retaliation in a similar fashion.
In neither case
did the attacks catch everyone on our side by surprise. Our military leaders in Washington, through
the interception and decryption of a message from Tokyo to its negotiators in
Washington, knew beyond a reasonable doubt that Pearl Harbor would be attacked
four hours before the attack took place, but failed to convey a warning to
General Short and Admiral Kimmel until it was too late. They knew by the night
before
that an attack would occur somewhere in the Pacific. By the next morning, when the last part of
the cable had been decrypted and they saw that the negotiators were ordered to
deliver their message ending peace talks at 1 pm Washington time, they could
see that the most likely target for attack was Pearl Harbor. That was 7:30 am Honolulu time, which was
approximately dawn, the most likely time for an attack. See “Six Myths of the Traditional Pearl Harbor
Story”
by Michael T. Griffith for a good short summary.
No
more than the American public or the American Congress, Short and Kimmel had
not been told about the November 26 ultimatum to Japan that made war virtually
inevitable. The most obvious conclusion
to be reached is that to do so, like alerting them the morning of December 7 or
the evening of December 6, would have resulted in their preparation to defeat
the sort of attack that occurred. Japan’s
spies in Hawaii, it was known, would have detected these preparations, and the
desired war-starting attack would have been called off.
A
number of people seemed to have had advance notice of the 9/11 attacks. To the list of links provided in this article, one might also
add the group of “celebrating Israelis” who got themselves into place to “document the event.” In the specific case of Building 7 of the
World Trade Center, the BBC and CNN seem to have had prior warning of its
collapse because they reported that it had fallen before it had done
so.
As
for the claims by various people in the Bush administration, detailed in this web site, that they could
not possibly have imagined such a stunt as hijacking airliners and flying them
into buildings, they are perhaps best belied by the fact that the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) had planned a drill for
precisely that
on the day of the attacks.
From all
indications, the ships at Pearl Harbor that were damaged by the attack either
sank or they did not in accordance with the laws of physics. That seems not to have been the case with
respect the buildings damaged in New York or Arlington,
VA if the official narrative is to be
believed. No one has ever been given any reason to
suspect that Pearl Harbor was a false flag incident. Although General Short had been led to
believe by his superiors in Washington that the greatest danger he faced was
from sabotage, and prepared accordingly, no one has claimed that sabotage
caused any of the damage that occurred on December 7, 1941. By contrast, virtually all of the damage that
occurred on 9/11 bears a very close resemblance to sabotage.
The United States
was able to portray itself purely as a victim in each case. Such “victimology” is completely
consistent with the historical tactics of one particular interest group that
wielded a great deal of power within both the Roosevelt and Bush
administrations. Pearl Harbor brought
the United States into the war against that group’s greatest enemy, Nazi
Germany, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, himself, said that the 9/11
attacks were “good for Israel.” It can also be safely said that Israel is the
only country in the world where the majority of the population favored the U.S.
invasion of Iraq.
The comparisons and the contrasts could go
on and on, but we shall conclude by noting that the war in which the United States became involved as a result of Pearl
Harbor was against other countries that would end in the usual way, when one
side or the other surrendered. Since
9/11, our leaders have told us that we are in a war against a tactic, an
abstract noun, “terrorism,” and that is a war that promises no end. An abstract noun cannot sign surrender
papers.
*
“Col. Melvin W. Maas, of the Marine Corps Reserve, former Minnesota
Congressman, said that when two hundred fifty patrol bombers necessary to bring
Hawaii up to required minimum strength of three hundred planes came off the
production lines, Washington ordered them sent to Britain. When protests were made to Roosevelt, he
referred the admirals to Harry Hopkins, in charge of allocating war materials.
“’Hopkins
received them as he lay in bed, nonchalantly smoking a cigarette,’ said
Maas. ‘He listened to them, then told
them the interview was over and that he had already made the allocation. Adm. Kimmel told me if those two hundred fifty
patrol planes had been sent to Hawaii, the December 7 attack could never have
succeeded, and probably would never have been attempted.’” (George Morgenstern,
Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War, Kindle location
approx. 2300)
David
Martin
April
3, 2014
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